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hroughout much of its short history, envi-
ronmental protection in the United States has been guided by a
traditional paradigm based on strict regulatory guidelines for reducing emissions and
punishments for noncompliance. Experts credit this traditional approach with improvements in air and
water quality evident since the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created more than 30
years ago. Tough environmental standards imposed under programs such as the Clean Water Act and
the Clean Air Act filled a regulatory void and forced industries to cut their emissions or face heavy fines.
Many of the greatest gains were seen with respect to point sources such as smokestacks and effluent pipes
that could be easily monitored. But beyond the avoidance of penalties, industries regulated under these so-
called command-and-control programs had little motivation to develop advanced pollution control tech-
nologies, which produced little economic gain.
Today, many stakeholders believe a more modern framework based on economic incentives that allow
companies to profit from achieving environmental goals will build on the achievements of the past and allow
for even greater improvements in environmental protection. Types of incentives vary widely, but they all
share one thing in common: they attach a monetary value to the act of reducing pollution. In a January
2001 document titled The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment,
the EPA described several types of incentives, including fees and taxes levied on pollutant releases, tax
rebates for environmental technologies, and the trading of air emissions permits on the open market. 
Attention is increasingly turning to the use of economic incentives in the wake of President George
W. Bush’s pledge to make them a foundation of his environmental policy. During the 2000 presiden-
tial campaign, Bush said that under his watch government would “set high environmental standards
and provide market-based incentives to develop new technologies . . . so that Americans could meet
and exceed those standards.”
Business organizations have responded warmly to the administration’s support for incentives.
For example, the Business Roundtable, a Washington, D.C.–based nonprofit organization of
“CEOs committed to improving public policy,” released a statement on 17 May 2001 that
“applauds President Bush for incorporating the use of new technologies, as well as incentives that
spur technological innovation, as the cornerstone of the administration’s national energy policy.” 
Among the environmental community, the idea that market instruments could be used to con-
trol pollution was initially greeted with skepticism and even hostility. But over time, support has
risen to a level that Joseph Goffman, a senior attorney with the public interest group Environmental
Defense in Washington D.C., describes as “lukewarm to enthusiastic in many cases.” 
According to Goffman, economic incentives motivate companies to reduce pollution quickly and
to exceed environmental standards whenever possible. This is in contrast to command-and-control
approaches, which he says stifle innovation while encouraging polluters to do little more than meet
minimum requirements. Under a traditional system, the EPA not only sets environmental standards,
it often describes how companies should achieve them—a scenario sometimes described as “technolo-
gy forcing.” 
Goffman suggests the downside to this approach is that the EPA usually only sets standards that can
be met with current technology. This means companies have to wait for the agency to finish a technology
review before either the EPA or the states revise a given standard. “With incentive programs,” he says, “you
don’t have this kind of chicken-and-egg mentality. The agency sets a target and leaves the means of compli-
ance up to industry. Companies want to profit from pollution control, so they invest more resources in tech-
nology development.” Furthermore, Goffman adds, market forces naturally gravitate toward the least-cost
option for reducing pollution, while traditional regulatory strategies lock companies into technologies that
become progressively less effective, and thus less attractive, over time.
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gauge where and how incentive programs
will grow under the Bush administration.
This is because a host of key positions at the
EPA and other agencies remain unfilled, and
policy directions have yet to be fully clari-
fied. However, Bush’s commitment to mar-
ket forces is undiminished, as indicated by
comments from White House spokesperson
Marcy Viana, who, referring to the presi-
dent’s position on global warming during an
interview on 4 June 2001, said, “[He is]
committed to reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions by drawing on the power of the mar-
ket and the power of technology.”
Emissions Trading Schemes
The most significant developments in
incentive programs have occurred in the
area of emissions trading, through which air
pollutants are viewed as tradable commodi-
ties, each with its own regional, national,
and even international markets. In an emis-
sions trading program, companies that emit
less than their assigned limits, or caps, of a
pollutant can sell residual allowances on the
open market or bank them for future trans-
actions. This gives other, higher-polluting
facilities a choice: either buy allowances and
continue releasing the same pollutant or
clean their own emissions—whichever is
cheaper. The only stipulation is that region-
al environmental quality continue to meet
mandated standards.
These so-called cap-and-trade schemes
aren’t new. The best-known example is the
Acid Rain Program established under the
Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, which
allows electric utilities to trade allowance
credits in sulfur dioxide (SO2). Many
experts point to this initiative, which
achieved dramatic reductions in SO2 at
lower costs than expected, as an emissions
trading success story. The EPA estimates
that since the program was formalized in
1995, annual emissions of SO2 have fallen
by 4 million tons, while rainfall acidity in
the Northeast has dropped by 25%. Dallas
Burtraw, a senior fellow at Resources for the
Future in Washington, D.C., says the pro-
gram works well because it’s simple, it sets
firm environmental targets, it keeps transac-
tion costs to a minimum, and it’s transpar-
ent—meaning that information on available
allowances and credit trades is freely avail-
able to the public.
The success of the Acid Rain Program
has fueled the development of similar initia-
tives within the private sector. Undeterred
by President Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto
Protocol, a diverse group of 34 major com-
panies called the Chicago Climate Exchange
(CCX) recently announced an emissions
trading scheme for carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. Boasting high-profile
members such as BP, Ford Motor Company,
DuPont, and International Paper, this effort
aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
5% below 1999 levels by 2005. The CCX’s
role will be similar to that of an organized
commodity exchange—it will establish the
requisite technical infrastructure, common
standards, and a computerized platform
through which participants can trade in
emissions reductions. 
Richard Sandor, project leader at the
CCX, points to the following hypothetical
trade as an example of how the system will
work: Two companies, a manufacturer with
advanced pollution control technology and a
power plant with older controls, agree to
cut their combined emissions of
greenhouse gases by
three tons each for a total
of six tons. Taking advan-
tage of its superior technolo-
gy, the manufacturer can cut its
own emissions by five tons at
minimal cost while the power plant
can only reduce its own emissions
cost-effectively by one ton. But by pur-
chasing the rights to the additional two
tons from the manufacturer, the power
plant pays for another company to reduce
greenhouse gases on its behalf. In this
win–win situation, the manufacturer takes
in revenues for reducing pollution while the
power plant avoids higher costs by passing
off its emissions reductions agreement to
another source. 
According to Sandor, the CCX will
facilitate trades among seven midwestern
states that together comprise the fourth-
largest trading bloc in the world. The CCX
also plans to include Brazil as a member,
indicating the organization hopes to achieve
an international presence. Says Sandor,
“We’ve had a fantastic response from indus-
try. We expect to be in the design phase for
12 months and to begin trading by 2002.”
The states have also gotten into the game.
In Southern California, a cap-and-trade 
program known as the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market, or RECLAIM, is being
used to control SO2 and nitrogen oxide
(NOx) air emissions from 360 industrial facil-
ities, including power plants, in Los Angeles
and the San Bernardino Valley. A coali-
tion known as the Ozone Transport
Commission, comprising the
environmental agencies
from 13 northeastern
and midwestern
states and the
federal
EPA,
has devel-
oped a cap-
and-trade program
for NOx. And else-
where, in Chicago, a cap-
and-trade program for volatile
organic compounds was established
by the Illinois EPA in early 2000. 
The states have, for the most part, had a
measure of success with these programs. The
Ozone Transport Commission announced
on 10 May 2001 that NOx emissions for
1999 and 2000 were less than half those
reported in 1990, before the cap-and-trade
system was implemented. California’s
RECLAIM system has been in operation
since 1993 but is just now beginning to
demonstrate results. The reason for the
delay, says Sam Atwood, spokesperson for
the Diamond Bar–based South Coast Air
Quality Management District, which coor-
dinates RECLAIM, is that state-mandated
“allocations” (a state term that defines the
emissions that can be traded under the cap)
for SO2 and NOx have only recently been
set at levels below actual emissions released
by industry. For several years after the pro-
gram was initiated, facilities regulated under
RECLAIM were allowed to emit SO2 and
NOx at unusually high levels to cushion the
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[President Bush] is
committed to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions     
by drawing on the power
of the market and
the power of technology.
–Marcy Viana, White House spokespersoneconomic shock of a recession that took
place during the early 1990s. “By dropping
the allocation levels below real emissions,
we’re just starting to cross over to the point
where the incentive begins to kick in,” says
Atwood. “This is when we expect to see vol-
untary improvements in technology.” 
The Question of Mobile Sources
In a recent and somewhat controversial
trend, emissions trading schemes have
begun incorporating mobile sources,
such as cars and trucks. Under this
approach, stationary sources
such as factories can obtain
emission credits from regula-
tors by paying to have old,
highly polluting vehicles
taken off the road. For
example, RECLAIM recent-
ly issued a rule allowing sta-
tionary sources to receive
mobile source credits by replacing
diesel-fueled heavy-duty vehicles with
cleaner-running alternatives. 
Burtraw suggests this practice provides a
major opportunity for cost savings. “It can
be a lot less expensive to reduce emissions
from mobile sources than stationary
sources,” he explains. But he concedes that
adding mobile sources to the mix doesn’t
come without its own unique set of chal-
lenges. “People are all too willing to bring in
an old lemon that barely runs so they can
collect $500 from a utility company,” he
says. In a case like this, the emissions reduc-
tion is negligible because the car isn’t drive-
able anyway. 
Goffman says programs that include
mobile sources need to incorporate safe-
guards to prevent this kind of abuse. The
challenges exist, he says, but solutions are
available if the systems are well designed at
the outset. The South Coast Air Quality
Management District, for example, only
agrees to pay credits for cars that could con-
tinue running for three years or more.
Trading Issues
Despite a generally positive response from
the stakeholder community, emissions
trading still raises a number of important
concerns. Perhaps the greatest worry is that
it might lead to “hot spots,” or areas of
high pollutant exposure. A company that
cuts its emissions in half might help reduce
average air pollution concentrations in a
particular region, but this means little to
those who live close to an older facility that
buys credits rather than upgrading its pol-
lution control technology. 
John Walke, director of clean air pro-
jects with the Natural Resources Defense
Council in Washington, D.C., suggests that
environmental justice problems could arise
if the dirtier facilities are located close to
poor communities. “There are a lot of fun-
damental issues that need to be addressed
with these systems,” he says. “One is the
extent to which pollution sources may be
heavily localized in a particular area. It’s
important to consider how much pollution
the neighboring communities are already
saddled with.” 
And what about facilities located
upwind of residential communities? Should
they be allowed to purchase air pollution
credits if downwind populations don’t expe-
rience the benefit of cleaner emissions?
Experts suggest the answer is no, and that
hot spots can be avoided with effective plan-
ning. Suellen Keiner, director of the Center
for the Economy and the Environment at
the National Academy of Public Admin-
istration, a public interest group based in
Washington, D.C., says potential solutions
include discouraging trades across long dis-
tances and on-site review of credit uses to
protect against hot spots.
Another incentive category that tends to
trouble environmentalists is “open market”
emissions trading, which is a scheme devel-
oped by the EPA in 1995. Unlike cap-and-
trade programs, neither the overall sectors
nor the individual trading sources regulated
under an open market trading system are
subject to a cap. Rather, any source that
finds that its actual rate of emissions is
below permitted levels for even a short time
is eligible for credit that it can save for later
or sell to another source. A chief concern is
that under these schemes industry sets the
standard for emissions allowances—not the
regulatory agency. This is critical, given
widespread agreement among stakeholders
that health-protective standards should be
set by the government on behalf of the pub-
lic, while the means of compliance is left to
the regulated community. 
Burtraw says monitoring emissions under
an open market system is particularly chal-
lenging. “Unlike cap-and-trade programs,
which are often targeted toward large station-
ary sources that can be monitored at the
stack, open trading is geared toward smaller
sources, for example dry cleaners,” he
explains. “It’s difficult and expensive to moni-
tor actual emissions from these sources, so
they tend to be estimated based on economic
activity and the use of a given technology. On
paper, open market trading seems promising,
but in practice monitoring is often poor, and
emissions inventories are weak.”
Responding to New Jersey’s announce-
ment of an open market trading system for
NOx, approved by the EPA in early 2001,
Environmental Defense called on the agency
to withhold additional pending approvals in
states including Michigan, New Hampshire,
and Illinois. Also critical of open market
trading is the Washington, D.C.–based
organization Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility. This group,
which says it represents anonymous EPA
employees who fear the repercussions of
speaking out publicly, issued a white paper
in June 2000 called Trading Thin Air in
which they claim that state and federal agen-
cies don’t have the ability to monitor these
programs. According to the paper, open
market trading could “cripple enforcement
of the Clean Air Act against stationary
sources of pollution.” 
Despite the uproar, many experts believe
open market systems will improve over time.
“I do have a healthy dose of skepticism
about open market trading,” says Burtraw.
“It isn’t based on sound policy and should-
n’t be used on a wide scale. But I also see it
as a way to include in trading programs a
variety of smaller sources of emissions for
which there do not exist emission invento-
ries. At best, open market trading should be
viewed as a transitional stepping stone to
some better-developed institution that will
emerge in the future.” 
Outlook for the Future
When applied to the nation as a whole, the
EPA suggests in its April 2001 report that
“the potential savings from widespread use
of economic incentives . . . could be almost
one-fourth of the approximately $200 bil-
lion per year currently spent on environ-
mental pollution control in the United
States.” In applying these tools, the EPA
recommends that regulators consider their
use in the context of political acceptability,
potential for stimulating technological
improvements, and enforceability. A num-
ber of important questions need to be con-
sidered: How many sources are there for
each pollutant? Does a unit of pollution
from each source have the same health and
ecologic impact regardless of where it’s
released? Who’s being affected by the pollu-
tion, and will the program reduce these
impacts?
A key point raised by Burtraw is that
incentives are a tool—not a solution. “You
can compare incentives to a hammer,” he says.
“You can use a hammer to build a house, or
you can use it to pull out the nails. This is the
big issue we’re facing now—if we use the
incentives to back away from emissions reduc-
tions, then we’re using the hammer to pull
out the nails. But if we use incentives to
aggressively pursue emissions reductions in the
most cost-effective way, then we’re building a
stronger house for the future.” 
Charles W. Schmidt
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